Following the ideas of Bohr, Von Neumann, and Benioff, we formulate quantum decision theory (QDT) as the quantum-mechanical theory of measurement for probability operators. QDT captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including many incorporated intentions. It is based on the hypothesis that the thought processes of real human beings involved in the definition and analysis of alternative prospects and scenarios do not necessarily separate them according to the recipes of standard probability theory and of classical utility theory. Our QDT formalizes systematically a broader class of decision making processes in which prospects can interact, interfere and remain entangled. The mathematical QDT is developed so as to be applicable to real-life decision making processes. We demonstrate that all known anomalies and paradoxes documented in the context of classical utility theory are reducible to just a few mathematical archetypes, all of which finding straightforward explanations in the framework of QDT. Interference terms, which are essential for resolving the paradoxes, quantify the aversion of human beings to uncertainty and/or to perceived potential loss resulting from their decisions.
I Introduction
As early as 1929 and then in later writings, [6] [7] [8] [9] Niels Bohr stressed several times that the then new quantum theory of atomic particles had strong analogies with mental processes. As his statements attest, in the analysis and synthesis of mental processes, "we are forced to deal with the situation which in many respects is similar to what we have in atomic physics".
8 "With the ideas of quantum theory, inaccessible to our usual understanding, we have obtained a tool for describing the most general problems of human thinking". 6 Bohr was convinced that mental human processes could be described by quantum mechanics. However, he did not offer more information on how to implement this program and account for the many paradoxical properties of psychological processes.
One had to first wait for the mathematical foundation of quantum mechanics, given by Von Neumann. 38 In his theory of measurement, Von Neumann considers the projection operators as statements about events, the expectation values of these operators yielding the probabilities of the events. Another important step was by Benioff 2-4 who developed a general theory of decision procedures in the context of quantum mechanics based on probability operator measures. In Benioff's quantum decision theory (QDT), the decision procedure is formulated in close analogy with the process of measurement in quantum theory. An algebra of probability operators plays the role of the algebra of quantum observables. The averages of the probability operators define the probabilities of the corresponding actions.
In his description of the general algebraic properties of QDT, Benioff [2] [3] [4] stressed that the concrete details of decision procedures were irrelevant. As a consequence, the generic mathematical properties of QDT makes it potentially useful for a variety of applications. For instance, QDT should be relevant to the development of theories of quantum information processing and of quantum computing, because the transformation of information in computing devices and in quantum channels has similarities with the process of decision making. Beyond pure quantum processes, the mathematical structure of QDT can be also applied to macroscopic objects, for instance, to human beings or to human societies, following the suggestion by Bohr 7, 9 that quantum theory could be used for the description of complex systems about which not all information is available. Certainly, humans are extremely complex systems with many inaccessible features, such as emotions, biases, and subconscious processes. Indeed, even the most modern and precise measurements and localization of brain activity offer at best a rough cartography of physical operations only indirectly related to the thought processes. While inaccessible, one should not underestimate the importance of emotions and of subconscious processes in decision making, as is evidenced by a growing body of multidisciplinary research. The problem is that these inaccessible features of brain processes cannot be accounted for in the decision procedures based on the classical utility theory. 37 As a consequence, a variety of different anomalies and paradoxes have emerged from the confrontation of classical decision theory with empirical data on the decisions and choices made by real humans. These paradoxes are well documented in a voluminous literature, of which we cite here only some review-type articles, 32, 45, 53 where further references can be found.
Recently, we have introduced a novel formulation of QDT, 53 which captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including many incorporated intentions. Our QDT is founded on more than just the argument that human decisions involve complex processes beyond the reach of detailed empirical or theoretical analysis. It is based on the hypothesis that the thought processes involved in the definition and analysis of alternative prospects and scenarios do not necessarily separate them according to the recipes of standard probability theory. Our QDT formalizes systematically a broader class of decision making processes in which prospects can interact, interfere and remain entangled. When such generalization to standard probability theory and to the usual optimization of some utility function is introduced, we find that all the paradoxes are explained as unavoidable consequences of the more general process of decision making described by the QDT.
In the present paper, we show that our QDT is a direct descendent of the Benioff 2-4 scheme, while complementing it by concrete notions that are necessary for practical applications. We thus construct a bridge between the abstract Benioff theory and the applications of QDT to concrete real processes. Specifically, in order to obtain useful and operationally working predictions, a severe complication arises due to the necessity of considering that a decision procedure is not merely a set of simple actions, but rather the composite set of prospects. As we show, dealing with composite prospects involves entangling operations, which results in the appearance of decision interference characterizing decision procedures under the perception of uncertainty and/or potential harmful consequences. We apply the developed machinery to several examples typical of various paradoxes of classical decision theory. By the corresponding theorems, we prove that no such paradoxes exist in QDT. To be precise, we describe in the Appendices the mathematical structure of the most known classical paradoxes. As we show below, all these anomalies and paradoxes are easily cured within QDT.
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section 2 introduces the definition of "intended actions" and "prospects" and of the mathematical space to describe them. Section 3 defines the mathematical structure of the mode states, mode space and the space of mind. Section 3 introduces the probability operator measure. Section 4 defines the prospect probabilities as being the observables in the decision process. Section 5 describes the rules according to which a decision is performed within the mathematical construction of QDT. Section 6 describes the phenomenon of decision interference occurring under uncertainty and/or perceived potential harm. For this, the notion of composite prospect is introduced and the principle of "aversion to uncertainty and loss" is defined. Section 7 applies the previous definitions and concepts to binary decision cases, as they form the most common situation in the empirical literature. Section 8 shows how the major paradoxes documented in the literature are explained within QDT. The following paradoxes are addressed: the Allais paradox (or compatibility paradox), the independence paradox, the Ellsberg paradox, the inversion paradox, the invariance violation described by Kahneman and Tversky, the certainty effects, the disjunction effect (or violation of the Savage sure-thing principle), the conjunction fallacy, and the isolation effect (or focusing, availability, salience, framing, or elicitation effects). Section 8 ends with a prediction on the condition under which several of these paradoxes can occur simultaneously. In particular, we predict that the conjunction fallacy should be accompanied by the disjunction effect. Section 9 summarizes and concludes. Appendices A (respectively B and C) gives the mathematical structure of Allais' paradox (respectively of Ellsberg's and Kahneman and Tversky's paradoxes).
II Intended Actions and Prospects
Decision making is concerned with the choice between several intended actions that, for brevity, can be called intentions or just actions. The analog of actions in classical probability theory is the notion of events forming a field of events. In contrast, in QDT, actions are not necessarily commutative and, generally, do not compose a field. Noncommutativity of actions in QDT is similar to the noncommutativity of events in noncommutative probability theory. 47 This echoes the general observation that intended actions in real life are also very often noncommutative (see references and discussions in [11] [12] [13] 53 ). It is interesting to note that Pierce 40 was probably the first to emphasize that logical statements are generally noncommutative. His formalization of his relative logic 40 is based on the recognition that the order of logical statements can be essential. We start from these premises to describe and analyze the algebra of actions within QDT.
A. Action ring
Let us consider a set of intended actions
where the actions are enumerated with the index n = 1, 2, . . .. It is natural to require the validity of the binary operation addition, such that for every A, B ∈ A their sum A + B ∈ A. The sum A + B means that either the action A or action B is intended to be accomplished, hence A + B = B + A. The addition is assumed to be associative, so that for any A, B, C ∈ A, one has A + (B + C) = (A + B) + C. By direct extension, the addition is defined as a reversible operation, such that from A + B = C it follows that A = C − B. Thus, the elements of the action set (1) form the action group, which is an Abel group with respect to addition. Another natural binary operation for the action of set (1) is multiplication, when for any A, B ∈ A, there exists AB ∈ A. The product of actions AB implies that both actions are intended to occur together. The multiplication can be defined as a distributive operation, for which A(B + C) = AB + BC. However, since the order of the actions is important, the multiplication is not commutative, so that AB is not the same as BA. When writing AB, we mean that the action B is to be accomplished before A. This makes it painless to define the associative triple product ABC = (AB)C = A(BC). The zero element 0 can be introduced as that satisfying the equalities A · 0 = 0 · A = 0 for any A ∈ A. This element characterizes an empty action, that is, when actually no action is intended. If one would assume that the action set (1) does not contain the divisors of zero, so that AB = 0 for any nonzero A and B, then the nonzero elements of set (1) would form a groupoid with respect to multiplication. However, this is not the case as the action set (1) does indeed contain divisors of zero: any product of two disjoint actions, by definition, is an empty action, so that mutually disjoint actions are divisors of zero with respect to each other. By this definition, two nonzero actions are disjoint if and only if their intersection is an empty action.
The described properties characterize the action set (1) as a noncommutative ring, which will be called the action ring. A set of subsets of A, closed with respect to countable unions and complementations, is a σ-ring, and if A pertains to this set, it is a σ-field. For the purpose of developing our QDT, we need to specify some constructions that can be formed with the actions belonging to the action ring A.
B. Action modes
In decision theory, an intended action can possess several representations corresponding to different particular ways of realizing this action.
53 Such a composite action takes the form of the union
whose partial terms are the action modes, with M n ≥ 1 being the number of modes. When M n = 1, the action (2) is simple.
C. Action prospects
A more complicated structure is an action prospect, which is an intersection
of the actions A n j from a subset A n of the action ring A. The actions in the product (3) can be either simple or composite as in the union (2).
D. Elementary prospects
The simplest structure among the action prospects (3) corresponds to the prospects including only the simple single-mode actions or separate modes of composite actions. Let {j n } α be a set of indices labelling simple actions or separate modes. The elementary prospect is the product
where each A njn is simple and enters only one of the prospects, so that different elementary prospects are disjoint in the sense that their conjunction is an empty action, e α e β = 0 (α = β).
E. Prospect lattice
For use as a decision theory, it is important that the set of all possible prospects could be in some sense ordered. Suppose that the set {π n } of admissible prospects can be organized so that, for each two prospects from {π n }, an ordering binary relation ≤ can be defined. Then for each pair π 1 and π 2 , one should have either π 1 ≤ π 2 or π 2 ≤ π 1 . The ordering relation is linear, such that π 1 ≤ π 2 implies π 2 ≥ π 1 . And it is transitive, so that, if π 1 ≤ π 2 and π 2 ≤ π 3 , then π 1 ≤ π 3 . Such a partially ordered manifold {π n } composes a lattice.
The lattice is assumed to be complete, containing the minimal and the maximal elements, for which inf
Thus, we obtain a complete lattice of partially ordered prospects,
named the prospect lattice.
III Mode and Prospect States
The notion of states is crucial in quantum theory. 28 And it is equally important in QDT.
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In order to represent the quantum-mechanical states, we shall employ the Dirac 20, 21 notation, which allows for a very compact representation of formulas.
A. Mode states
For every single mode A nj of an action A n , we put into correspondence a state |A nj >, which is a function A → C. A conjugate state (in the sense of a Hermitian conjugate) is denoted as < A nj |, and will be useful in the definition of the scalar product and for introducing the probability operators associated with intentions and prospects. For each two mode states a scalar product is defined as < A ni |A nj >, which is a function A × A → C. The mode states can be normalized to one, and they are assumed to be orthogonal, so that
where δ ij is the Kronecker symbol. The orthogonality here reflects the fact that the action modes A ni and A nj for i = j represent incompatible actions.
B. Mode space
The closed linear envelope, spanning all mode states, composes the mode space
The dimensionality of M n is dimM n = M n . For each two elements |A > and |B > of M, a scalar product is defined enjoying the property < A|B >=< B|A > * (where the symbol * denotes the complex conjugate) and all other properties characterizing scalar products.
20, 28
That is, the mode space (7) is a Hilbert space.
C. Basic states
Using the mode states |A nj >, it is possible to construct the states of the elementary prospects (4) as functions A × A × . . . × A → C,
where j n ∈ {j n } α . The states (8) are termed the basic states. Their scalar product is given as
where i n ∈ {i n } α and j n ∈ {j n } β . Given the orthonormality of the mode states, one has < e α |e β > = δ αβ .
The orthonormality of the basic states again reflects the fact that two elementary prospects e α and e β are incompatible for α = β.
D. Space of mind
The space of mind, or just mind, is the closed linear envelope
spanning all basic states (8) .
The space of mind (9) is a Hilbert space, represented as a tensor product of the Hilbert spaces M n . If the number of Hilbert spaces M n is infinite, the space (9) is understood as a Von Neumann 36 infinite tensor product.
E. State of mind
The state of mind |ψ > is a normalized vector of M. As any vector of the Hilbert space (9), it can be expanded over the basis states (8) ,
The normalization condition reads as
The state of mind characterizes the mind of the decision maker.
F. Prospect states
To each action prospect (3), one can put into correspondence a prospect state |π n > ∈ M. As any member of M, it can be expanded over the basic states (8) ,
The states (13) do not need to be neither orthogonal nor normalized. For the empty prospect, there corresponds the vacuum state |0 >, such that
for any |e α > ∈ M.
IV Probability Operator Measure
We follow the scheme of Benioff 2-4 to introduce a probability operator measure. The main difference between our approach and Benioff's is that we consider, not an abstract set of actions but, the set of prospects forming a complete lattice. Specifying a prospect as a composite action, we keep in mind that real decisions are usually made by choosing among composite actions, and not among simple structureless actions. As we show below, the existence of internal structures within prospects has consequences of great importance for applications.
Let Σ(L) be a set of subsets of the prospect lattice L, closed under countable unions and complementations. Then Σ(L) is a σ-ring of L. And let B(M) be the set of all bounded linear positive operators on the Hilbert space M. Let us consider a mappingP : Σ(L) → B(M) enjoying the following properties. For an empty prospect,
where0 is the zero operator in B(M). The mappingP is self-adjoint, so that for any π n ∈ L, one hasP
where the cross implies the Hermitian conjugate. A mappingP , satisfying conditions (14) and (15), is an operator measure. Including L in Σ(L) makes the latter a σ-field. Then
where1 is the identity operator in B(M). An operator measure, satisfying conditions (14), (15) , and (16), is the probability operator measure {L, Σ(L),P }. More information on operator measures can be found in the literature. 5 And the general properties of probability operator measures have been described in detail by Benioff.
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In our case, the probability operator measureP is defined on the σ-ring Σ(L) of the prospect lattice L = {π n }. This probability operator measure includes the probability operators of the prospectsP (π n ). The latter can be represented in the Dirac 20, 21 notation aŝ
The prospect probability operators (17) are similar to projection operators, but are not exactly projectors as they lack the property of being idempotent. In addition, the operators (17) are not commutative. Benioff finds that the operators of these measures do not need to be neither projection operators nor have to commute with each other.
The set of all probability operators (17) , over the field of complex numbers C, forms the algebra of probability operators
The involution in P is defined as the Hermitian conjugation. Since operators (17) are selfadjoint, the involution in P is a bijection. Thus, P is an involutive bijective algebra. A property of the probability operators (17), which is of utmost importance for QDT, is thatP (π n ) is generally an entangling operator. One should not confuse entangled states and entangling operators. Entangled states are such that they cannot be represented as tensor products of partial states. 30, 39, 48 Entangling operations are those that produce entangled states, even when acting on disentangled states. [50] [51] [52] Entangling operations in decision theory are of crucial importance, resulting in a variety of nontrivial effects. The entangling property of the probability operators (17) is due to the composite structure of the action prospects π n .
V Prospect Probabilities as Observables
The algebra of probability operators (18) is analogous to the algebra of local observables in quantum theory. 10, 22, 24 In quantum theory, observable quantities are defined as the expectation values, or averages, of the operators over the algebra of local observables. The complete set of these expectations composes the statistical state of a quantum system.
The observable quantities in QDT are the expectation values of the probability operators, which define the scalar probability measure. 3 The expectation of a probability operatorP (π n ), under the state of mind |ψ >, is
The corresponding observable quantity is the prospect probability
Taking into account the explicit form of the probability operator (17), from Eqs. (19) and (20), we have
This expression shows that p(π n ) is non-negative. Of course, the normalization condition
is imposed, where the summation is over all π n ∈ L. Thus, the mapping (20) defines the scalar probability measure p :
Definition 5.1. The probability p(π n ) of a prospect π n ∈ L is the expectation value (20) of the probability operator (17) , with normalization condition (22) .
The scalar probability measure, introduced above, makes it possible to realize the ordering of the prospects in the prospect lattice L, classifying them as follows.
Definition 5.2. Two prospects, π 1 and π 2 from the prospect lattice L, are indifferent
Definition 5.3. Between two prospects π 1 and π 2 belonging to the prospect lattice L, the prospect π 1 is preferred to π 2 (π 1 > π 2 ) if and only if
Definition 5.4. A prospect π * ≡ sup n π n in the prospect lattice L is optimal if and only if the related prospect probability is the largest 
VI Interference of Composite Prospects
The decision procedure described in the previous section, when applied to composite prospects containing composite actions, results in nontrivial consequences. This is due to the fact that the probability operators (17) for composite prospects correspond to entangling operations.
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Therefore, several modes of a composite action interfere, leading to the appearance of interference terms. The occurrence of several modes of an action implies the existence of uncertainty and of the perception of possible harmful consequences. In contrast, the elementary prospects (4) yield no interference. This is because the states of the elementary prospects are the basic states (8) which are disentangled.
A. Composite prospects Definition 6.1 A prospect π n ∈ L is composite if and only if it is formed by not less than two actions and at least one of its forming actions is composite.
The prospect state (13) can be represented as a superposition
of the partial weighted states of the elementary prospects,
The probability of such a weighted elementary prospect, under the state of mind |ψ >∈ M, according to Eq. (21), is
Taking into account Eqs. (11) and (27) , this gives
To be classified as a probability, p n (e α ) is to be normalized, so that
which will be always assumed in what follows. The peculiarity of dealing with composite prospects is that the prospect probability p(π n ), generally, is not a sum of the partial probabilities (29) .
Proposition 1. The probability of a composite prospect π n ∈ L, under the state of mind |ψ >∈ M, is the sum
of the partial probabilities of the weighted elementary prospects (29) plus the interference term
Proof: Formula (31) follows from the definition of the prospect probability (20) , or (21) , with the substitutions of Eqs. (11) and (13), and with the use of notations (29) and (32) .
Note that the appearance in QDT of the interference term (32) is analogous to the interference effects in quantum mechanics. 27 In QDT, interference happens for composite prospects, containing actions represented by several modes. Therefore it involves interferences between modes, which may have two different origins. First, the state of mind |ψ > can be expected in general to be entangled. But more important is that the probability operator (17) is an entangling operator, which can create entangled states even from disentangled ones. [50] [51] [52] This is somewhat similar to the generation of entanglement in the transfer of information through quantum channels.
14 There exists several measures of entanglement 30, 39, 48 and of entanglement production.
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It is important to stress that the degree of entanglement is correlated with the level of order in the considered system. 52 This is especially clear if the system order is classified by means of the order indices, [15] [16] [17] [18] which can be introduced for arbitrary operators, 49 and in particular, for reduced density matrices. 19 Roughly speaking, the notions of order and entanglement are complementary to each other. 52 The more a system is ordered, the less it is entangled.
In decision theory, the presence of disorder is equivalent to the existence of uncertainty, and the latter is accompanied by risk. 25, 31, 33 Keeping in mind the above discussion, we can associate the interference term (32) with the uncertainty caused by the presence of several modes representing one action as well as with the perception of potential harmful consequences accompanying the decision-making process occurring under uncertainty.
B. Aversion to uncertainty and loss
The following two definitions give an explicit formulation of the principle of "aversion to uncertainty and loss", which replaces the principle of risk aversion, as being necessary to understand and explain the decision making processes of real human beings. 
From these definitions and formula (31) , it follows that the more uncertain or the potentially more harmful prospect π 1 possesses a smaller interference term q(π 1 ) and, hence, a smaller probability p(π 1 ). Thus, the stronger perceived uncertainty or potential harm suppresses the prospect probability. In selecting an optimal prospect, subjects try to avoid potential harm.
In order for the previous definitions to be applicable to real decision processes, it is necessary to specify the notion of uncertainty and of perceived potential harm by formulating a sufficient condition for one of the prospects to be treated as more uncertain or more potentially harmful than another. Note that (b) is the double negation of (a), and (d) is the double negation of (c). Hence, from the point of view of mathematical logic, 35 the statements (a) and (b) are equivalent, as are (d) and (c).
Remark. We are careful to distinguish the concept of "uncertainty or perceived potential harm" from "risk." Risk involves the combination of the uncertainty of a loss and of the severity or amplitude of that loss. In contrast, uncertainty and perceived potential harm that we consider in QDT emphasize more the subjective pain that a human subject visualizes in her mind when she considers her options and makes her decision.
C. Interference alternation Proposition 2. Let us consider a lattice L of prospects π n , with the prospect states |π n > ∈ M, under the normalization conditions (22) and (30) . Then
Proof: Summing the prospect probabilities (31) over all π n ∈ L, and using the normalization conditions (22) and (30) yields (33) .
Remark. The interference alternation (33) shows that some of the interference terms are positive, while other are negative, so that the total sum of all these terms is zero. This means that the probability of prospects with larger uncertainty and/or perceived potential harm will be suppressed, while that of less uncertain and/or harmful prospects will be enhanced.
VII Binary Prospect Lattices
In the majority of applications, one considers the structures equivalent to a binary lattice L = {π 1 , π 2 }, containing two composite prospects. In order to address these applications, we specify below the above considerations to the case of a binary lattice.
A. Binary lattice
Suppose that A and X are the actions from the action ring A. And let A contain just two modes,
While X ∈ A, it can include M 2 ≥ 2 modes,
The mind dimensionality is therefore dimM = 2M 2 . The elementary prospects A n X j define the basic states |A n X j >, with n = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, . . . , M 2 . The state of mind (11) takes the form
Let the prospect lattice L = {π n } consist of two prospects
The prospect states (13) read as
The probabilities of elementary prospects (29) are now
with their normalization condition (30) written as
The interference term (32) becomes
Then the prospect probability (21) yields
in agreement with formula (31) . And the normalization condition (22) reduces to
The theorem on interference alternation (Proposition 2) leads to the equality
This case of a binary prospect lattice L = {π 1 , π 2 } explicitly demonstrates that the interference term (41) is caused by the occurrence of the composite action (35) making prospects (37) composite. The interference between several modes reflects an uncertainty and/or a perceived potential harm accompanying the choice of one of the modes representing the composite action.
From the principle of "aversion to uncertainty and loss" (Definitions 6.2 and 6.3), one can conclude the following. If the prospects π 1 and π 2 are perceived as equally uncertain and/or potentially harmful, then the theorem on interference alternation (44) yields q(π 1 ) = q(π 2 ) = 0.
And when one of the prospects, say π 1 , is more uncertain and/or potentially harmful than π 2 , then, by Definition 6.4 and equality (44) , one has
B. Conditional probabilities
Let us consider two actions, A and X from the action ring A, with the action A being arbitrary and the action X being composite as in notation (35) . By the definition of the action ring A, an action AX j implies joining two actions A and X j to be accomplished together, with the probability p(AX j ). The related conditional probability p(A|X j ) can be introduced in the standard manner 26 through the identity
Here p(X j ) is a prescribed weight of the action X j , satisfying the conditions
Interchanging in identity (46) the actions A and X j , one gets
where p(A) ≡ p(AX) is assumed. The above relations can be formalized as follows.
Definition 7.1. For the actions A and X from the action ring A, where A is arbitrary and X is a composite action given by Eq. (35) , the conditional probability p(A|X j ) of A under condition X j and the conditional probability p(X j |A) of X j under condition A are defined by the equations
where the weights p(X j ) satisfy the normalization (47) . It is worth emphasizing that p(A|X j ) does not equal p(X j |A). Recall that this is so already in classical probability theory. 26 There is even less reason to expect their equality in QDT. The relation between the conditional probabilities (49) is given by the following formula.
Proposition 3. The conditional probabilities p(A|X j ) and p(X j |A), defined in Eq. (49) , satisfy the relation
Proof: Let us consider the prospect AX, with an arbitrary A and with the composite X given by Eq. (35) . Then, according to Eq. (42), the corresponding prospect probability is
Substituting this into the second of Eqs. (49) an using Eq. (46), we come to relation (50) .
Remark. Formula (50) is the generalization of Bayes' formula of classical probability theory.
26 Equation (50) reduces to the Bayes formula, provided that there is no interference (q(AX) is zero), and that the actions pertain to a field where all actions are commutative. However, in QDT, the actions belong to a noncommutative ring A, so that in general p(AX j ) and p(X j A) are not equal, since AX j is not the same as X j A. As already mentioned, the noncommutativity of actions is an important feature of QDT.
C. Noncommutativity of actions
Since the action ring A is not commutative with respect to multiplication, the prospects AX and XA from L are generally different, in the sense that p(AX) does not coincide with p(XA).
Proposition 4. Let us consider two prospects AX and XA in L, with A ∈ A being arbitrary and X being a composite action given in Eq. (35) . And let at least one of the action modes X j be certainly realized under action A so that
Then the prospects AX and XA are indifferent (AX = XA) if and only if there is no mode interference, that is,
if and only if
Proof: For the prospect XA, invoking the general procedure, we have
Employing here the definition of the conditional probabilities (49) gives
Using normalization (51) yields
Interchanging the actions A and X results in
From the latter two equations, we obtain the statement formalized in Eqs. (52) and (53) .
Remark. This theorem emphasizes the intimate relation between the noncommutativity of actions and the appearance of the interference terms. The action noncommutativity and the presence of action interference constitute both characteristic features of QDT.
VIII Explanation of Classical Paradoxes
A series of paradoxes have been unearthed which cannot find satisfactory explanations within the framework of classical utility theory. These paradoxes are well documented in an growing body of empirical evidence. Numerous related citations can be found in the review-type articles, 32, 45, 53 which provide detailed descriptions of these paradoxes referring to a voluminous literature. All these studies unambiguously show that decision makers systematically violate the predictions of classical utility theory, when decisions are made under uncertainty and risk.
The existence of such paradoxes in classical utility theory can be traced back to the fact that the impact of risk and uncertainty is embodied only within the choice of the utility function of the decision maker, which is supposed to fully capture by its functional shape the risk and uncertainty aversions of the agent. Given a set of competing actions or prospects, classical utility theory assumes that one can independently and objectively estimate their corresponding probabilities. Then, the preferred action is the one which maximizes the expected utility, where the expectation is performed over all possible scenarios weighted by their corresponding probabilities. In contrast, QDT takes into account the fact that the existence of competing actions or prospects in the presence of risk and uncertainty leads to an entanglement of the probabilities of these different actions, and therefore to distortions away from pure absolute objective probabilities. The interference terms and the noncommutativity of actions discussed above describe the fact that the probabilities of different actions depend on the coexistence of other potential actions in the mind of the decision maker. From the point of view of QDT, this single fact is at the origin of the paradoxes in classical utility theory. Since, as we now show, QDT is able to account qualitatively and quantitatively for all known classical paradoxes, this suggests that the axioms of QDT allowing for entanglement correctly embody at a coarsegrained level the effective thought processes underlying decision making of real humans.
In the present section, we discuss the main known paradoxes classified as such by classical utility theory. Naturally, each of these paradoxes can be represented by an infinite number of variants in different real life situations. And a large number of such illustrations has been described in the literature. 32, 45, 53 However, from the point of view of mathematics, there are only a finite number of typical structures. Here, our aim is specifically to analyze the mathematical structure of these paradoxes, omitting secondary descriptive details. In so doing, we provide a general demonstration that no such paradox occurs in the framework of QDT, allowing one to adapt the same reasoning to the many variants of each paradox.
A. Compatibility violation
This paradox, first described by Allais 1 and now known under his name, is a choice problem showing an inconsistency of actual observed choices with the predictions of expected utility theory. It is also often referred to as the violation of the independence axiom of classical utility theory. This paradox is that two decisions which are incompatible in the framework of classical utility theory are nevertheless taken by real human agents. The mathematical structure of the Allais paradox is presented in Appendix A. Its explanation in the framework of QDT is as follows.
Let us consider two composite actions
where M 2 ≥ 2. Four action prospects
form a quadruple lattice L = {π n }. Suppose that the prospect ordering is such that π 1 is strictly preferred to π 2 , hence,
with π 2 being perceived as more uncertain and/or potentially more harmful than π 1 , that is,
And let π 3 be preferred, or indifferent, to π 4 , so that
with the prospects π 3 and π 4 being of equal uncertainty and potential harm,
In addition, one assumes the balance condition
In the framework of utility theory, this condition makes incompatible the decisions associated with the ordering π 1 > π 2 and π 3 ≥ π 4 . In other words, this ordering is contradictory (see Appendix A). But this contradiction does not arise in QDT. 
Proposition 5. Let a quadruple lattice L = {π n } of prospects (55) be ordered so that (i)
Proof: The probabilities of the prospects (55) read as
Since π 1 > π 2 , in the sense of inequality (56), we have
Because of π 3 ≥ π 4 , according to Eq. (58), we get
Equation (63) can be rewritten as
And Eq. (64), invoking the balance condition (60), transforms into
Taking into account condition (59) reduces Eq. (66) to
Combining Eqs. (65) and (67) yields the desired result (61).
Remark. In the classical utility theory, there are no interference terms. The reduction of QDT to classical utility theory is obtained by setting the terms q(π n ) to zero. Then, Eq. (61) becomes a contradiction, which is nothing but the Allais paradox. In QDT, there is no contradiction (and no paradox) since the right-hand side of Eq. (61) is positive according to condition (57).
B. Independence paradox
As we already said, the Allais paradox not only reveals that real human beings can select decisions which are mutually incompatible within the standard expected utility theory, but it also shows that the independence axiom of utility theory is violated by real humans. The independence axiom stipulates that, if π 1 > π 2 and π 3 ≥ π 4 , then π 1 + π 3 > π 2 + π 4 . The mathematics of how this independence axiom breaks down is explained in Appendix A. In contrast, within QDT, the violation of the independence-axiom does not occur. Instead, we can state the following independence theorem.
Proposition 6. Let a quadruple lattice L = {π n } of prospects (55) be ordered so that π 1 > π 2 , with π 1 being perceived as more uncertain and/or potentially more harmful than π 2 , and π 3 ≥ π 4 , with π 3 and π 4 being of equal uncertainty and potential harm. And let π 2 + π 4 be more uncertain and/or more potentially harmful than or at the same perceived level as
Then the prospect π 1 + π 3 is strictly preferred to π 2 + π 4 , that is,
Proof: By employing the standard definition of the prospect probabilities, we have
Straightforward calculations give
Using inequalities (56), (58), and (68) yields the above inequality (69).
Remark. Let us stress that invoking the notion of uncertainty and/or perceived potential harm, which is rigorously related to the occurrence of the interference terms, makes Proposition 6 a theorem rather than an assumption.
C. Utility failure
Another well-known anomaly in the use of utility theory to account for real human decisions is called the Ellsberg 23 paradox. It states that, in some cases, no utility function can be defined at all, so that utility theory fails. The mathematical structure of the Ellsberg paradox is described in Appendix B. As we show below, such a paradox does not arise in QDT.
Let us consider two composite actions
where M 2 ≥ 2. The case of interest is the binary lattice L = {π n } of the prospects
The Ellsberg paradox is characterized by the equivalence condition
The prospects π 1 and π 2 are distinguished by the fact that p(A 1 |X j ) is given explicitly, while p(A 2 |X j ) is not explicitly available, but its existence is just stated. While the structure of the decision making process is such that (72) holds true, its formulation adds what has been termed an "ambiguity" for one of the prospects (π 2 ). Within QDT, this ambiguity is simply taken into account by saying that π 2 is perceived as more uncertain than π 1 which, according to the definition 6.4, implies q(π 2 ) < q(π 1 ) .
Human subjects are found to decide in favor of the less uncertain prospect π 1 , which is usually preferred to π 2 . But, as explained in Appendix B, the option π 1 > π 2 , under condition (72), cannot be explained with any utility function. In contrast, within QDT, the choice π 1 > π 2 is not merely admissible but is compulsory, given the structure of the problem. The prediction of QDT for this problem can be stated under the following proposition.
Proposition 7.
Let us consider the binary lattice L = {π n } of prospects (71), supplemented by condition (72). And let π 2 be perceived as more uncertain than π 1 . Then π 1 is preferred to π 2 , that is,
Proof: Following the standard procedure, we have
Invoking condition (72) yields
Taking into account that π 2 is more uncertain than π 1 , in the sense of Eq. (73), we obtain inequality (74) telling us that π 1 > π 2 (π 1 is preferred to π 2 ).
Remark. The reduction of QDT to classical utility theory is obtained, as usual, by putting the interference terms to zero. In this case, p(π 1 ) is equal to p(π 2 ), which is incompatible with the choice π 1 > π 2 performed by most real human beings, retrieving the Ellsberg paradox.
D. Inversion paradox
A large series of paradoxes found when applying classical utility theory to the decision making of real human beings are related to the unexpected inversion of choice, when decisions are made in the presence of uncertainty. In other words, the ordering or preference of competing choices according to classical utility theory is reversed by human beings. For this literature, we refer to the numerous citations found in Refs. 32, 45, 53 This anomaly is often called the Rabin 41 paradox. Let us considers two composite actions
where M 1 ≥ 2 and M 2 ≥ 2. The prospect lattice L = {π n } is composed of M 1 prospects
Suppose that the partial probabilities obey the majorization condition
From the point of view of classical utility theory, under condition (77), the prospect π 1 should be preferred or equivalent to π 2 . However, subjects often decide in favor of π 2 , when π 1 is perceived as more uncertain than π 2 , which contradicts utility theory. But this contradiction is removed in QDT, as formulated by the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Let us consider a lattice L = {π n } of prospects (76). And let condition (77) be valid. Nevertheless, π 2 is preferred to π 1 , that is p(π 2 ) > p(π 1 ) , when π 1 is more uncertain than π 2 , such that
Proof: For the difference of the prospect probabilities, we have
This, together with condition (78), gives p(π 2 ) > p(π 1 ), which means that π 2 is preferred to π 1 . Remark. Within classical utility theory, characterized by the absence of interference terms, condition (78) would result in the inverse conclusion that π 1 is preferred to π 2 . The inversion paradox occurs in situations where subjects would nevertheless opt for π 2 > π 1 .
E. Invariance violation
This paradox was described by Kahneman and Tversky, 29 who pointed out that in some cases utility theory yields the same expected utility outcomes for several prospects, while subjects clearly prefer some prospects to others. The mathematical structure of the Kahneman-Tversky paradox is explained in Appendix C.
One considers four composite prospects, as in Eq. (76), under the invariance condition
Since condition (79) leads to the invariance of the expected utility function with respect to permutations or replacements among these four prospects, if subjects were basing their decision according to the recipes of classical utility theory, they should be indifferent with respect to the four choices. However, real human subjects demonstrate evident preference for some of the prospects, when the choices are accompanied by uncertainty. Kahneman and Tversky
29
characterize the prospect π 1 as yielding more uncertain gain than π 2 . And the prospect π 4 is defined as resulting in a more certain loss than π 3 , that is, π 4 is more potentially harmful than π 3 . Summarizing, one has
Under these conditions, there is no any paradox remaining within QDT, as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Let us consider a quadruple lattice L = {π n } of the composite prospects (76), under the invariance condition (79) and uncertainty conditions (80)
. Then π 2 is preferred to π 1 and π 3 is preferred to π 4 , so that
Proof: It is easy to notice that the Kahneman-Tversky paradox is nothing but a slightly complicated version of the Ellsberg paradox. The Kahneman-Tversky paradox can be treated as a particular case of the inversion paradox. Therefore the proof of Eqs. (81) is the same as in Propositions 7 and 8.
Remark. In classical utility theory, with no interference terms, all prospect probabilities would be the same for all prospects, contradicting inequalities (81). This is the meaning of the Kahneman-Tversky paradox of invariance violation (see appendix C).
F. Certainty effects
A number of paradoxes, related to the description of prospects as more or less certain, and robustly violating expected utility theory, are collectively called certainty effects. Typical examples of such paradoxes have already been discussed, such as the Allais paradox (Appendix A), the Ellsberg paradox (Appendix B), and the Kahneman-Tversky paradox (Appendix C), when real human subjects prefer a less uncertain prospect notwithstanding the fact that it has a smaller expected utility. The mathematical structure of such paradoxes, analyzed in the Appendices, demonstrates that these paradoxes are associated with difficulties in discriminating between different reward values.
In addition to these direct certainty effects, there exist reversed certainty effects, 44 when subjects prefer a more uncertain prospect. This happens when rewards are easily discriminated, being evidently different. The reversed certainty effects can also be explained in the framework of QDT.
Proposition 10. Let us consider a lattice L = {π n } of prospects defined in Eq. (76).
Suppose that a prospect π 1 is more uncertain or more potentially harmful that π 2 , in the sense that q(π 1 ) < q(π 2 ). Despite the fact that the prospect π 1 is more uncertain, it is preferred to π 2 when and only when
Proof: Writing the difference p(π 1 ) − p(π 2 ), as in Proposition 8, and requiring that p(π 1 ) be larger than p(π 2 ) yields condition (82).
Remark. When the left-hand side of Eq. (82) is close to zero, this inequality cannot be true in the presence of dissimilar uncertainties between the two prospects. Instead, inequality (78) holds, since, by assumption, q(π 1 ) < q(π 2 ). That is, we retrieve the direct certainty effect. But when the left-hand side of Eq. (82) is sufficiently large, this inequality may become valid, while Eq. (78) looses its validity. This means that the reversed certainty effect holds true. These conclusions confirm that the direct certainty effects emerge when it is difficult to discriminate between rewards, whereas the reversed certainty effects arise when the discrimination of rewards is easy, in agreement with empirical observations on decision making under uncertainty by human subjects.
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G. Disjunction effect
The disjunction effect is the violation of the Savage "sure-thing principle". 43 According to this principle, if an alternative A 1 is preferred to an alternative A 2 , when an event X 1 occurs, and it is also preferred to A 2 , when an event X 2 occurs, then A 1 should be preferred to A 2 , when it is not known which of the events, either X 1 or X 2 , has happened. In the literature, there are hundreds of examples of concrete realizations of the disjunction effect (see articles 32, 45, 46, 53 and references therein), all of them having the same mathematical structure.
One considers a binary lattice L = {π n } of prospects
where n = 1, 2 and M 2 ≥ 2. The majorization condition
is assumed. The Savage "sure-thing principle" 43 states that, under condition (84), the prospect π 1 must be preferred to π 2 . This, however, does not happen when π 1 is sufficiently more uncertain than π 2 , a situation which leads subjects to prefer π 2 over π 1 , in blatant contradiction with the Savage principle. The following proposition shows how this contradiction is removed within QDT.
Proposition 11. Let us consider a binary lattice L = {π 1 , π 2 }, with π 1 being more uncertain that π 2 , i.e., q(π 1 ) < q(π 2 ). And let the majorization condition (84) be valid. Notwithstanding this majorization, the prospect π 2 is preferred to π 1 , so that p(π 2 ) > p(π 1 ), provided that
Proof: We notice that the majorization condition (84) is a sufficient condition for inequality (77) to hold, so that the disjunction effect is a particular case of the inversion paradox. Following the same proof as in Proposition 8, we get inequality (78) as a condition for π 2 > π 1 . Using the theorem on interference alternation (Proposition 2), which for a binary lattice takes the form of Eqs. (45), we come to condition (85) under which π 2 > π 1 .
Remark. Equation (85) clearly shows the origin of the disjunction effect, contradicting the Savage "sure-thing principle". In classical utility theory, where the interference term q(π 2 ) is zero, the left-hand side of Eq. (85) is zero, while the right-hand side, owing to condition (84), is positive, leading to a contradiction. It is possible to check numerically, as we have done, 53 that condition (85) always holds when the disjunction effect is observed empirically.
H. Conjunction fallacy
The conjunction rule of classical probability theory requires that the probability of the conjunction of two events cannot be larger than any of the probabilities of the separate events forming the conjunction. However, again, when decisions are made under uncertainty, subjects often reliably violate the conjunction rule, which is termed the conjunction fallacy. 45 There exist numerous particular examples of this fallacy. 32, 45, 53 To describe the mathematical structure of the problem, let us consider two composite actions A and X and a lattice L = {π n } of the prospects
with M 1 ≥ 2 and M 2 ≥ 2. In applications, one usually takes M 1 and M 2 equal to two. But mathematics does not change for arbitrary M 1 ≥ 2 and M 2 ≥ 2. In classical probability theory, p(π n ) can never be smaller than any p(A n X j ) for arbitrary n and j. This is why, when it happens that there is at least one pair of n = n 0 and j = j 0 , such that subjects support the following inequality,
this is classified as the conjunction fallacy. There can exist several n and j for which the conjunction fallacy (87) occurs. The most general case is when there is at least one n 0 , for which condition (87) holds true, with j 0 corresponding to the largest partial probability, such that
In QDT, the conjunction-fallacy paradox finds a natural explanation, if decisions are made in the presence of uncertainty. 
Proof: From the difference
it follows that inequality (89) is the necessary and sufficient condition for Eq. (87) to be true. Remark. As stressed several times above, the reduction to classical probability theory can be done by setting all interference terms q(π n ) to zero. But then inequality (89) could never be true, showing that the conjunction fallacy is a real paradox in the framework of the classical theory. In QDT, as we have numerically checked in a number of concrete examples, 53 condition (89) always holds in the situations where the conjunction fallacy has been observed with human subjects.
I. Isolation effect
The isolation effect is a common name for a large variety of phenomena known under different guises, such as the focusing effect, the availability effect, the salience effect, the framing effect, or elicitation effect. 34 The essence of all these phenomena is that, when choosing among several alternatives, subjects are more inclined towards the certain benefits and at the same time they prefer the prospects with more uncertain losses. For instance, there exists a well documented tendency to prefer hidden to transparent taxes. 34 Subjects tend to prefer what is related to more uncertain loss, while not being necessarily optimal from the point of view of classical utility theory.
According to definition 6.4, an alternative with more certain loss is more repulsive than that one with more uncertain loss. In other words, subjects simply prefer alternatives that are less painful to them, when they choose those having more uncertain losses. Using this view point, the origin of the isolation effect can be easily understood in the framework of QDT.
Let us consider a lattice L = {π n } of prospects (86). Let the actions A j be enumerated so that
Then, according to classical utility theory, the prospect π 1 should be preferred to all other π n , with n = 1. In reality, however, this does not happen, 34 when π 1 is more uncertain or potentially more harmful. Subjects choose another prospect π n from L, with n = 1, which is less uncertain or harmful than π 1 .
Proposition 13. For a lattice L = {π n } of prospects (86), under condition (90), there exists a prospect π n , with n = 1, which is preferred to π 1 , when and only when the prospect π 1 is so uncertain or harmful that
Proof: Equation (90) is a slight generalization of the majorization condition (77) in the inversion paradox. Therefore the proof of inequality (91) is the same as in Proposition 8. If Eq. (90) is strengthened by the majorization condition (84), then the isolation effect reduces to the disjunction effect and can be treated as in Proposition 11.
Remark. In classical utility theory, where there is no decision interference, all q(π n ) are vanishing. In this case, the left-hand side of inequality (91) is zero, while the right-hand side is negative, leading to a contradiction. That is why the isolation effect is a paradox in the framework of classical utility theory. While such a paradox is absent in QDT.
It may happen that several paradoxes among those considered above occur simultaneously. In the literature, one usually studies each paradox separately. This suggests to consider novel experimental situations in which several paradoxes occur simultaneously in order to test our QDT through novel predictions in context not yet explored. To prove theoretically that such a situation can really happen, we analyze below the conditions under which the conjunction fallacy could coexist with the inversion paradox, and therefore with the disjunction effect which is a particular case of the inversion paradox.
We consider two actions A = A 1 + A 2 and X = X 1 + X 2 from the action ring A. And let the prospect π n be formed as in Eq. (86), with M 1 = M 2 = 2. We are thus dealing with the binary lattice L = {π n ≡ A n X : n = 1, 2} .
Suppose that X j are enumerated so that
This is just a notation, which simplifies the following formulas. In this notation, the conjunctionfallacy condition (87), taking account of Eq. (88), simplifies to
Depending on the value of p(A 1 X 1 ), three different situations can be found.
Proposition 14. Let us consider the binary lattice (92), with notation (93). And assume that
Then the conjunction-fallacy condition (94) makes the prospect π 2 preferred to π 1 , so that p(π 1 ) < p(π 2 ).
Proof. Suppose that the conjunction-fallacy condition (94) holds, which is a particular case of Eq. (87). According to Proposition 12, the necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of Eq. (87) is inequality (89). The latter, with notation (93), reads as
Keeping in mind the interference alternation theorem (Proposition 2), which for a binary lattice takes the form of Eqs. (45), inequality (96) can be rewritten as
For the right-hand side of Eq. (97), from condition (95), we have
Using the normalization condition (40) gives
In this way, inequality (96) acquires the form
This shows that Eq. (85) is valid, which, in the case of a binary lattice, is the necessary and sufficient condition for π 2 > π 1 (π 2 is preferred to π 1 ).
Proposition 15. Let us suppose that for the binary lattice (92), with notation (93), the inequality
holds. Then the assumption that π 2 is preferred to π 1 , in the sense that p(π 1 ) < p(π 2 ), results in the conjunction-fallacy condition (94).
Proof: For a binary lattice, the necessary and sufficient condition for p(π 1 ) < p(π 2 ) is inequality (85). Employing Eq. (99) gives
Under condition (101), one has
Combining Eqs. (102) and (103) yields Eq. (97), which is equivalent to inequality (96). The latter is the necessary and sufficient condition for the conjunction-fallacy Eq. (94).
Proposition 16. Let us assume that for the binary lattice (92), with notation (93), the equality
is satisfied. Then the conjunction-fallacy condition (94) is the necessary and sufficient condition for π 2 to be preferred to π 1 , so that p(π 1 ) < p(π 2 ).
Proof:
The proof is the same as in Propositions 14 and 15, except that inequalities (98) and (103), under equality (104), are replaced by the equality
Remark. The proofs of Propositions 14, 15, and 16 do not depend on the relation between p(A 1 X j ) and p(A 2 X j ). Therefore, if in addition to the assumptions underlying these propositions, we invoke the majorization condition (77), then the above propositions describe the interconnection between the conjunction fallacy and the inversion paradox. And if we add the majorization conditions (84), then we obtain the relation between the conjunction fallacy and the disjunction effect. The simultaneous occurrence of the latter two effects has not been analyzed experimentally, as far as we are aware. But, as we have proved, it may happen. From the analysis of the available experimental data on the conjunction fallacy, we find 53 that the latter is usually characterized by condition (95). Thus, we predict that the conjunction fallacy should be accompanied by the disjunction effect.
IX Outlook
We have presented a detailed description of Quantum Decision Theory (QDT), whose source can be found in insightful writings of Niels Bohr on the qualitative interpretations of measurements in quantum theory. 7, 9 Bohr advocated the feasibility of describing psychological processes, such as decision making, by means of mathematical techniques of quantum theory. Developing the theory of measurement, Von Neumann 38 noted that the projection operators can be treated as statements about events, with the operator expectations providing the event probabilities. Benioff 2-4 generalized the Von Neumann techniques and explicitly applied them to the process of decision making. The Benioff 2-4 formulation of QDT is the starting point of our approach. We have developed Benioff's theory is several aspects:
(1) We have specified the basic techniques of QDT so that they could be applicable to real decision processes. In particular, the manifold of intended actions is defined as a noncommutative ring, since noncommutativity is a typical property of quantum theory, which captures accurately what we believe is an essential property of human decision making. The set of action prospects is characterized as a complete lattice.
(2) The point of fundamental importance in our approach is that the action prospects are described as composite objects, formed by composite actions. The composite structure of prospects, together with the entangling properties of probability operators, result in the appearance of decision interferences, which take into account the uncertainties and repulsion to potential harmful consequences associated with the decision procedure.
(3) The noncommutativity of prospects and their interference are shown to be intimately connected, and they arise simultaneously.
(4) The interference of prospects is proved to exhibit the property of alternation, leading to the suppression of the probabilities of more uncertain or potentially more harmful prospects in favor of those of less uncertain or harmful prospects which are comparatively enhanced.
(5) We have demonstrated that practically all known anomalies and paradoxes documented in the context of classical utility theory are reducible to just a few mathematical archetypes, all of which finding straightforward explanations in the framework of QDT. The balance condition (A.2) here is valid, since p 1 (X 1 ) + p 3 (X 1 ) = p 2 (X 1 ) + p 4 (X 1 ) = 0.9 , p 1 (X 2 ) + p 3 (X 2 ) = p 2 (X 2 ) + p 4 (X 2 ) = 1 , p 1 (X 3 ) + p 3 (X 3 ) = p 2 (X 3 ) + p 4 (X 3 ) = 0.1 .
Decisions π 1 > π 2 and π 3 ≥ π 4 are clearly incompatible. The explanation of this paradox, given in Section VIII (subsection A), in the framework of QDT, is based on the fact that π 2 is more uncertain than π 1 , while π 3 and π 4 are of a comparable uncertainty. The balance condition (A.2) also leads to the violation of the independence axiom of expected utility theory. This axiom postulates that if π 1 is strictly preferred to π 2 , and π 3 is preferred or indifferent to π 4 , in the sense of conditions (A.3) and (A.4), then π 1 + π 3 is strictly preferred to π 2 + π 4 , so that U(π 1 + π 3 ) > U(π 2 + π 4 ) . 
Appendix C. Kahneman-Tversky paradox
The mathematical structure of the Kahneman-Tversky 29 paradox is as follows. One considers four prospects, as in Eq. (76). The actions A n characterize the choices, enumerated with n = 1, 2, 3, 4. The alternatives X j describe the amounts of money, such that U(X 1 ) < U(X 2 ) < U(X 3 ) and
The probabilities p n (X j ) are given in such a way that U(π n ) = const (n = 1, 2, 3, 4) , (C.2)
with the expected utility function defined as in Eq. (A.1).
The procedure is organized so that π 1 provides a more uncertain gain than π 2 , hence, π 1 is more uncertain that π 2 . And π 4 is defined as yielding more certain loss than π 3 , consequently, π 4 is more repulsive than π 3 . In response to the involved risks, real human subjects prefer π 2 to π 1 and π 3 to π 4 , which implies
in contradiction with Eq. (C.2).
In the original Kahneman-Tversky paradox, 29 the probability sets were defined as {p 1 (X j )} = {0.5, 0, 0.5} = {p 3 (X j )} , {p 2 (X j )} = {0, 1, 0} = {p 4 (X j )} .
The Kahneman-Tversky paradox does not occur in QDT, which is proved in Proposition 9.
